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  We study duopolistic pricing by ports that are congestible, share the same 
overseas customers and have each a downstream, congestible transport network to a 
common hinterland. In the central set-up, local (country) governments care about 
local welfare only and decide on the capacity of the port and of the hinterland 
network. We obtain the following results. First, profit-maximizing ports internalize 
hinterland congestion in as far as it affects their customers. Second, investment in port 
capacity reduces prices and congestion at both ports, but increases hinterland 
congestion in the region where the port investment is made. Investment in a port’s 
hinterland is likely to lead to more port congestion and higher prices for port use, and 
to less congestion and a lower price at the competing port. Third, the induced increase 
in hinterland congestion is a substantial cost of port investment that strongly reduces 
the direct benefits of extra port activities. Fourth, imposing congestion tolls on the 
hinterland road network raises both port and hinterland capacity investments. We 
illustrate all results numerically and discuss policy implications.   
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1. Introduction  
  
  This paper studies pricing and investment decisions in a market where 
congestible facilities compete for traffic, and where this traffic shares a congestible 
downstream facility with other users.  While highly stylized, the model captures key 
features of competition among maritime ports that are congestion-prone, and that 
serve a hinterland to which they are connected by congested transport networks.
1 
Consider, for example, European ports such as Rotterdam, Antwerp and Le Havre. 
These ports compete for traffic in an oligopolistic setting, and both the port facilities 
and (especially) road and rail networks in the hinterland have become increasingly 
congested.
2 We analyze investment and pricing decisions in this environment, 
emphasizing the interaction between the duopolistic port market and hinterland 
congestion. As such, the analysis is directly relevant to European port pricing and 
investment policy. 
Our analysis considers two congestible ports that compete for traffic in a 
market for overseas shipments, and focuses on the interaction between two 
components of the overall costs of such shipments: the costs of using port services 
and the cost of hinterland transport towards the final destination. We assume that 
shippers decide on the port of transshipment on the basis of the generalized cost of the 
complete trip from origin to destination, where the generalized costs includes the costs 
of sea transport, monetary and time costs at the ports, and the generalized cost of 
hinterland transport. We allow hinterland transport to be subject to a transport tax or 
toll; however, consistent with current European policies, due to the absence of road 
pricing, the hinterland tax is treated as exogenous and not necessarily optimal.    
In this setting, we analyze the interaction between the pricing behavior of the 
ports and optimal investment policies in port and hinterland capacity. The framework 
used is that of a two stage-game in capacities and prices. Moreover, the main focus of 
the paper is on a governance structure where capacity decisions are public but pricing 
is private; this is a simplified representation of actual decision-making structures 
                                                 
1 To focus on a few well defined aspects of the interaction port-hinterland, we ignore many real-world 
complications, like the behavior of private operators within ports, the structure of the shipping industry, 
supply chain considerations, etc. Introducing them into the current model would not affect the main 
lessons derived from the paper but would strongly complicate the technical analysis.  
2 Similar examples of competing ports with congested hinterlands include ports on the West Coast of 
the U.S., Mexican and U.S. ports in the Gulf of Mexico, etc.  The interaction between the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach in California is a variation on the theme developed here, in the sense that 
these ports share the same congestible hinterland.    2
pertaining to many ports in Europe. At the capacity stage, we assume that local 
(country) governments make optimal decisions with respect to port and hinterland 
investments, taking into account the pricing behavior of ports. We assume that they 
take the port and hinterland capacities of the other region as given. At the pricing 
stage of the game, privately operating ports determine port prices, taking into account 
potential congestion at the port itself and, as we will see, on the hinterland transport 
network. For purposes of comparison, at the pricing stage we also briefly compare 
private pricing with two other pricing regimes: public pricing by the local government 
and overall surplus-maximizing port pricing.
3  The game is analyzed by backwards 
induction.  
This paper is related to recent work on the interaction between strategic 
behavior in oligopolistic markets and congestion (see Brueckner, 2002; Basso and 
Zhang, 2006; De Borger and Van Dender, 2006; Pels and Verhoef, 2007). Moreover, 
it builds upon earlier work dealing with the pricing of transport services on simple 
parallel and serial networks that are jointly used by transit (through traffic) and by 
local traffic (see De Borger, Proost and Van Dender, 2005; De Borger, Dunkerley and 
Proost, 2007). Essentially, our set-up is that of a parallel network problem, where each 
alternative consists of two serial links that are only imperfectly controlled by the local 
government. Our main contribution is that we consider interactions between an 
upstream duopolistic market and downstream congestion.  
The main results are as follows. First, we show that ports will charge their 
users not only for congestion at the port facilities, but also for that part of the extra 
hinterland congestion they impose on their other customers. Cases of such “partial 
internalization” have been noted before, although in a different context. For example, 
Brueckner (2002) finds that oligopolistic carriers at airports internalize congestion 
caused by their own flights in as far as it affects their other flights.
4  Our analysis 
shows that partial internalization applies to hinterland congestion: ports with heavily 
congested hinterlands will charge higher prices, ceteris paribus. Second, extra 
investment in one port reduces congestion at both ports (as in De Borger and Van 
Dender, 2006), but it raises hinterland congestion in the region where the port is 
located. We further show that investment in a port’s hinterland is likely to lead to 
                                                 
3 The pricing rules are extensions of those derived in Braid (1986), Verhoef et al. (1996) and Van 
Dender (2005). 
4 The empirical work by Mayer and Sinai (2003) supports the internalization hypothesis, but more 
recently  Harback and Daniel (2007) find evidence against internalization.   3
more congestion and higher prices for port facility use, and to less congestion and a 
lower price at the competing port. A third finding is that welfare maximizing local 
governments will tend to strategically invest to support the local port, but that the 
induced increase in hinterland congestion is an important cost of port investment. 
Moreover, in line with the strategic trade literature (e.g. Brander and Spencer (1985) 
and Barrett (1994)), price competition between ports has relevant implications for 
public investment decisions. Specifically, the results suggest that duopolistic port 
pricing induces reduced public provision of port capacity, and more so when 
downstream congestion is not internalized.  The reason is that the reduced capacity 
leads to higher port profits, and reduces hinterland congestion (which is beneficial 
when there are no congestion tolls). Fourth, we find that, in a congested hinterland 
environment, higher transport taxes on the hinterland road network raise both port and 
hinterland capacity investments.  
  Lastly, comparing the results under private pricing with those obtained under 
the assumption that pricing as well as capacity decisions are under the control of the 
local government, we show that private ports do not necessarily charge higher port 
prices. If hinterland congestion is severe and port-related traffic is only a small 
fraction of hinterland transport, private ports actually charge less than public ports, 
because they ignore the welfare losses of local hinterland users when setting prices. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a presentation of the model 
components in section 2, we analyze in section 3 the strategic pricing game between 
private operators for given capacities. In section 4 we discuss the investment 
strategies of the government that guide decisions on port capacity and hinterland 
capacity. In section 5 we numerically illustrate a number of our theoretical findings. 
The last section discusses policy implications and offers concluding comments. 
 
2. Model structure 
 
  We study two congestible facilities (e.g. ports) that compete for traffic; users 
of these facilities make their decisions based on the generalized cost of the complete 
trip (which includes, in the case of ports: sea transport, port monetary and time costs, 
and the generalized cost of hinterland transport). For example, an overseas shipment 
from New York to the German industrial Ruhr area may use the ports of Antwerp or 
Rotterdam. If the shipper selects Antwerp, this implies the use of the Belgian road or   4
rail network; if the shipment goes through Rotterdam, it is affected by hinterland 
conditions on the Dutch network. We assume the decision makers for these shipments 
take congestion as exogenously given, both at the facility and on the hinterland 
network.
5  The ports compete for traffic, as it generates port revenue. 
  Of course, both the assumption of duopolistic ports and the linking of each 
port to a given hinterland is a bit restrictive: ports are more generally oligopolistic, 
and in reality several ports may compete for the same hinterland. Although the main 
reason for the assumptions made is analytical tractability, all qualitative results are 
likely to carry over to the case of a port duopoly with a competitive fringe. This is a 
fairly reasonable description of port competition in the Hamburg-Le Havre range, 
where Rotterdam and Antwerp have a much larger market share than other ports.  
  We study pricing for port facilities and investment decisions with respect to 
both port and hinterland capacity. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the 
government is the main responsible for both investment decisions, but that private 
operators decide on port prices. This situation is a reasonable, though imperfect, 
description of the current situation in Europe. Most of the sea access investments 
(deepening of access routes, investment in locks, etc.) are indeed controlled and 
financed by the public sector. Port handling operations are often privately controlled 
by a few operators. We simplify the analysis by aggregating them into one private 
monopoly operator per port. We further allow for fixed tolls or taxes on the hinterland 
network. This describes most motorways where pricing takes the form of fuel taxes 
that are uniform across the country. Note that these hinterland tolls are assumed to be 
exogenous, and that we do not consider the government’s problem of setting optimal 
tolls. Implementing optimal road pricing is difficult in practice, and very few 
European countries have attempted to do so; moreover, ignoring the issue of optimal 
hinterland tolls and focusing on investment decisions for the local (country) 
government keeps the problem analytically manageable.    
We model the decision-making process in each region in two stages: the 
government of each region first decides on port and hinterland capacities; given these 
capacities, the private port operators decide on prices for the use of port facilities. In 
this second stage, given local investment policies, the ports compete for traffic and 
                                                 
5 This is quite realistic for congestion on the hinterland. It is more debatable for port congestion: in fact, 
it rules out ports where only a few shipping companies take the bulk of the traffic. If this is the case, 
theory suggests that shipping companies would partly internalize congestion (Brueckner, 2002).   5
engage in a pricing game. We study the problem by backward induction. At the port 
pricing stage, we are interested in the effect of hinterland congestion and capacities on 
prices. At the capacity investment stage, we are interested in the effects of congestion 
and the facilities’ pricing behavior on the optimal policies of the government. 
Specifically, we analyze how the optimal investments take on board the pricing game 
played by ports.  
  Turning to specifics, consider two possibilities to ship goods from an origin to 
a destination (see Figure 1 below)
6. One passes through facility A, the other through 
B. To save on notation, we similarly denote the routes passing through these facilities 
as routes A and B. Traffic at facility A is denoted  A X ;hinterland road or rail transport, 
A V , consists of transport generated by facility A,  A X , plus local traffic on the 
hinterland network, denoted  A Y . Units of  X are measured such that they both capture 
demand for port services and demand for port-related hinterland transport (think, e.g., 
of containers). 
  Total shipments from origin to destination are given by  A B XX X = + . It is 
assumed that the owner of the shipped goods is indifferent as to the route chosen 
(except for their generalized cost), so the routes are perfect substitutes. This is a 
heroic assumption for ports that specialize in particular types of trade, but it may be 
defended in the case of container trade, a strong and growing segment of the shipping 
market.
7 Overall demand is given by the inverse demand function ()
X p X . Similarly, 
demand for local use of the hinterland network is described by inverse demand 
functions  ()
Y
A A p Y  and  ( )
Y








                                                 
6 A similar network structure has been used in recent work by Pels and Verhoef (2007). However, they 
focus on modal competition between road and rail. The focus of our paper is on the interaction between 
public infrastructure managers and private port operators, and on the role of congestion on one network 
link (the hinterland) for pricing and investment decisions.     
7 Introducing imperfect substitutability of ports tends to weaken the strength of the effects identified in 
our analysis, but it does not fundamentally change them; it does add considerable analytical 
complexity.   6




















  The generalized cost of the use of route A is the sum of three components: (i) 
the transport (money plus time) cost to facility A, (ii) the monetary and time cost at 
facility A, and (iii) the money and time cost of the hinterland road network. Since cost 
component (i) does not play much of a role in our analysis, we set it equal to zero. We 
define the generalized cost of use of facility A as the sum of the port charges and the 
time cost, which depends on the demand for the use of port services  A X  and the 
capacity of port facilities at A, denoted as 
f
A K . Hence the generalized price of port 
facility use at A is: 
   (,) , 0 , 0
f AA









where  A p  is the charge for the use of port A, and the function  (.) A f  is what we will 
call for simplicity the ports ‘congestion’ function. Note, however, that it not only 
represents the pure time cost of access to and cargo handling within the port, but also 
all subjective quality elements that affect the generalized cost of the trip.
8 The 
congestion cost depends positively on demand and negatively on port capacity.  
                                                 
8 In fact, the port capacity indicator 
f
A K  can more generally be interpreted as a quality variable that is 
affected by the deepening of the sea access, lower administration costs etc. What is important is that the 
function  (.) f depends on the flow and capacity indicator.    7
  The generalized cost of hinterland transport in A is denoted as  A g . It is the 
sum of money (e.g., fuel costs) and time costs of the hinterland trip, plus applicable 
tolls on the hinterland connection. Since they are not relevant to our analysis, we 
ignore the money costs. Hence, the generalized cost   A g  of hinterland transport is  
   (, )
h
A AA AA A g hX YK t =+ +     
In this expression  
   (, ) ( , ) , 0 ,0
hh AA









is the hinterland congestion function, 
h
A K  is road capacity on the hinterland network, 
and  A AA VXY =+  is the total hinterland transport volume. The time cost of hinterland 
transport positively depends on the total transport volume in A and negatively on the 
transport capacity of the hinterland. Finally,  A t  is the exogenous local toll on the 
hinterland link. The exogeneity reflects the fact that currently used tax and toll 
instruments do not allow for an optimal hinterland tax. Notation and definitions are 
similar for route B. 
  We assume that in equilibrium, port-related traffic will be distributed over the 
two routes A and B so as to equalize the overall generalized costs of the complete 
trips; this includes port (monetary plus time) costs as well as hinterland travel costs. 
Equilibrium of transit (i.e., traffic passing through the facility) and local traffic then 
implies the following:  
  
() ( , ) ( , )
() ( , ) ( , )
() ( , )
() ( , )
Xf h
A BA A A A A A A A A
Xf h
A BB B B B B B B B B
Yh
AA A A A A A A
Yh
BB B B B B B B
p XX pf X K h XY K t
p XX pf X K h XY K t
pY g hX YK t
pY g hX YK t
+= + + + +
+= + + + +
== + +
== + +
              (1) 
  In Appendix 1 we show that the solution of the equilibrium conditions (1) 
implies reduced-form demand functions:
9 
   
( , ,,,,; , )
( , ,,,,; , )
( , ,,,,; , )
( , ,,,,; , )
rf f h h
A AB A B A B A B
rf f h h
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rf f h h
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rf f h h






                                                 
9 We rule out corner solutions in which only one of the routes (and one of the ports) is used. These 
would introduce non-continuities in the reduced-from demand functions, and would not offer additional 
insights.    8
which have the following properties (similar for demand in B): 
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  Higher port prices at A reduce demand at A and raise it at port B. Increases in 
port capacity in port A raise demand at A, and lower demand at B; better hinterland 
capacity at A raises demand in A and reduces it in B.  
  The effects on local hinterland transport are easily derived as well. We find, 
see Appendix 1:   
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Higher port prices in A raise local demand on A’s hinterland because they reduce 
port-related traffic there. The opposite holds for a price increase at port B. Increasing 
the capacity of port A reduces the local demand for transport on A’s hinterland, and 
raises it in region B; both effects are again due to congestion effects of port-related 
traffic. Finally, more hinterland capacity in A raises local demand on A’ hinterland 
network; moreover, it increases local demand in region B as well, because the shift in 
port traffic from B to A reduces congestion in B. 
      
3. Pricing behavior of port facilities 
 
  In this section, we first consider a private port’s optimal pricing policy. Next, 
we analyze the Nash equilibrium outcome of price competition between the ports and 
investigate how it depends on investment in port capacity and in hinterland 
connections on port prices. Finally, we compare the results with those assuming other 
pricing regimes. 
   9
 
3.1. Pricing behavior of an individual facility 
 
  Throughout this subsection, we consider profit  maximizing  port  facilities.    
Facility A solves: 
   ()
A
A AA A A p Max p X C X π =−  
where (.) A C is the facility’s cost function, and demand is given by reduced-form 
demand, i.e.,  ( ; ,,,,; , )
rf f h h
A AAB A B AB A B X XppKKKKtt = . Port A maximizes with respect 
to its own price, taking prices at B as well as port capacities and hinterland capacities 
as exogenously given. The first-order condition is given by: 






















 is the marginal production cost of an increase in port 
services at A. 
  In Appendix 2 we show that (4) implies the following pricing rule: 
   () (1 )
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are the marginal external costs at the port facility and on the hinterland road network, 
respectively. The functions  (, ; )
h
iii i zXK t, defined in Appendix 1, express demand for 
local hinterland transport as a function of hinterland capacity, the level of port-related 









<1. Finally, the coefficient  B θ  is given by: 
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. Simple algebra shows that this implies 
that 1 0 B θ −≤ ≤ . Note that  0 B θ =  if there is no congestion at the competing port B. 
  To interpret pricing rule (5) note that, if there is no hinterland congestion, we 
reproduce the pricing rules found in Braid (1986), Verhoef et al. (1996) and Van 
Dender (2005); they studied pricing behavior in the absence of a downstream market.. 
Indeed, for zero hinterland congestion, simple algebra shows that (5) reduces to: 
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This pricing rule implies that ports charge a double markup above the marginal port 
cost. First, they charge the marginal external cost 
f
A MEC at the port itself: the facility 
charges its users for the reduction in quality (increase in time costs) they impose on 
other port users. That the port fully internalizes the external cost makes intuitive 
sense, as the externality is imposed on the port’s own customers. Raising the price 
above private cost reduces demand, but it also reduces congestion (or, alternatively, it 
facilitates access). Second, congestion allows the port to charge more than marginal 
external cost. If overall shipping demand is not very elastic and the competing port is 
congested then a port can increase profits by raising price substantially above 
marginal social cost. Doing so does not strongly reduce overall demand, and the price 
increase will not shift many customers to the competing, but congested, port. The 
second markup is therefore higher the smaller the price elasticity of demand and the 
higher the congestibility of the competing facility (see, e.g., Van Dender (2005) for 
more discussion).  
  Of particular interest in this paper is the role of hinterland congestion in the 
port pricing rule (5). Introducing hinterland transport and hinterland congestion has 
two effects on pricing. The first one is due to hinterland congestion in A itself; it is 
captured by the term  











The port facility charges port users for the marginal congestion cost they cause on the 
hinterland, but only to the extent that it affects other port users. To see this, note that   11
the marginal congestion cost on the hinterland, due to an exogenous increase in port-
related traffic, is given by:   











More port use raises hinterland congestion, but the ultimate increase in traffic volume 
is limited as more port-related traffic reduces the demand for road use by locals. 
Hence, an increase in port-related hinterland transport generates less than the full 
marginal external cost of an exogenous increase in total traffic flow  A V ; as noted 
above, the bracketed term is smaller than 1 (also see A1.3 in Appendix 1). Further 
note that he facility ignores external costs suffered by local transport on the hinterland 
network; they only charge for the fraction suffered by other port users (see the term 
/ A A XV ).  
  The intuition for internalizing part of the hinterland congestion is again easily 
understood. A price increase by a port will reduce demand, but this reduction will be 
limited by the associated reduction in hinterland congestion. Hence the port will 
charge more than it would in the absence of hinterland congestion.  
  The second effect of hinterland congestion is that it raises the elasticity related 
markup. Here hinterland congestion at the competing port B is the driving force. This 
follows from considering the definition of  B θ  in the final term of (5). If demand is not 
very elastic and the competing port’s hinterland suffers from severe congestion, port 
A knows it can raise prices without losing much demand, so stronger price increases 
are obtained in the profit maximum.   
  Clearly, pricing rule (5) implies that prices will exceed private marginal 
production costs even if there is no congestion at the port facilities itself, due to 
hinterland congestion. Charging for part of the hinterland congestion cost reduces 
hinterland congestion and makes the corresponding port more attractive. Of course, 
the numerical importance of this effect depends on the share of port-related transport 
in total hinterland transport. A further implication of (5) is that, if one considers two 
identical facilities with different hinterland congestion problems, then prices will be 
higher and demand lower at the facility in the country with high hinterland 
congestion.  
 
   12
3.2. Comparison with other pricing regimes 
 
We conclude this subsection with a brief discussion of other port pricing 
regimes. First, assume that the government of a given region directly controlled the 
prices of the local port of that region. Let the objective function of the regional 
government consist of the net benefits of the local users of the hinterland 
infrastructure, plus the profits of the local port and the tax revenues on the 
hinterland
10. The analytical results for this regime are derived in Appendix 3. 
Interestingly, we find that optimal pricing behavior in this case differs from the 
behavior of a profit maximizing port only in the response to hinterland congestion. As 
shown before, a private port charges for the external cost to the extent that it affects its 
own customers. The local government on the other hand charges for hinterland 
congestion only to the extent that the toll on the hinterland is below the marginal 
external cost of hinterland road use. This has an interesting implication to which we 
return in the numerical analysis below. It implies that, if hinterland congestion is 
severe, no tolls are charged on the hinterland and port-related traffic is a small fraction 
of hinterland transport, then private ports may well charge less than the public local 
authority. The conditions described may actually capture the current European 
situation.   
Second, consider optimal pricing by a supra-national authority (this could be 
an institution such as the European Union, or even covering the world level) that not 
only controls port prices in both regions but also cares about the welfare of shippers: it 
maximizes global welfare in the two regions jointly, and it incorporates the welfare of 
shippers in its objective function. The analytical results are derived in Appendix 4. 
Compared with the pricing rule of private port operators, we find two important but 
expected differences. One is that, contrary to the private operator, the supranational 
authority does not charge an elasticity-related markup. The other is that a private 
operator ignores the time losses of local hinterland traffic; the supranational port 
authority does take these into account, but again only corrects for hinterland 
congestion to the extent that tolls on the hinterland are suboptimal. If market power is 
                                                 
10 It is assumed here for simplicity that the regional government ignores the welfare of shippers. Strictly 
speaking, this will only be realistic if all shippers welfare goes to foreign firms. Although the share of  
foreign shippers in European ports is large, part of port-related traffic obviously has its departure or 
destination in the corresponding region (for the port of Antwerp, e.g., think about deliveries for General 
Motors). Although we could have introduced local shipments into the analysis, it would have cluttered 
the main lines of the arguments made in this paper without affecting the main insights.      13
non-trivial and the former effect dominates, the private operator will therefore charge 
higher prices.  
We summarize the main differences between regimes in Table 1. 
 
3.3. Port competition: Nash equilibrium prices  
  
  We return to pricing under private duopoly and study the effects of hinterland 
and port capacities on Nash equilibrium prices. Note that the optimal pricing rule for a 
given port implicitly gives the reaction function to price changes at the competing 
port. Solving the reaction functions yields the Nash equilibrium in prices, which we 
can write in general as: 
    ( , , , ;,) , ( , , , ;,)
NE f f h h NE f f h h
A ABAB A B B ABAB A B p KKKKt t p KKKKt t.  
The equilibrium obviously depends on all capacities and on the exogenous tolls in 
both hinterland regions.  To discuss the effects of the various capacities on Nash 
equilibrium port prices, we make some simplifying assumptions. Therefore, we 
assume in this subsection linear demand functions (both for overall shipping demand 
X from origin to destination and for local hinterland demands  , A B YY ); moreover, we 
assume both port and hinterland congestion are linear functions of the relevant 
volume-capacity ratio. 
    Using these assumptions, we show in Appendix 5 hat investment in port 
capacity unambiguously induces both ports to reduce prices: 
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In a sense, this is as expected, because port capacity investments not only reduce port 
congestion in the port where investment takes place, it also reduces overall shipping 
demand and hence congestion at the competing port (see, e.g., De Borger and Van 
Dender, 2006). Unfortunately, the impact of expanding hinterland capacity on port 
prices is ambiguous, even under the assumed linearity of demand and costs. Unless 
port-related traffic on the hinterland is very important, however, we show (see 
Appendix 5 that: 
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Better hinterland connections in A raise the price of port A, because it raises demand 
and congestion at port A and this more than compensates the reduction in congestion 
in the hinterland of A. The same investment in A’s hinterland capacity reduces port 
prices of the competitor, because it reduces demand and both port and hinterland 
congestion at B.         
 
4. Optimal capacity investment in ports and in hinterland networks 
 
  We assume the government is responsible for decisions on investments in port 
as well as hinterland capacities. Of course, optimal investment rules will strongly 
depend on the objective function one assumes for the government in a particular 
region. Here, we assume that government takes into account the profits of intra-
regional port activities; moreover, it cares about the welfare of the local users of the 
hinterland network. The assumption is that, for example, Belgium cares about surplus 
from port activities in the port of Antwerp, but also about the welfare of Belgian users 
of the hinterland road network. Importantly, we assume the Belgian government does 
not specifically care about the time losses that shippers suffer on the network, but it 
does care about the tax revenues it receives from their use of the hinterland capacity, 
and about the profits the regional port can earn on their use of port facilities. In this 
sense, our setup reflects an extreme case, where any surplus from shippers accrues to 
foreign firms.
11  









Yr r r f f h h r r
A A A A A AA A A A AAA A
KK
o
Max p y dy g Y p X C X k K k K t X Y ⎡⎤ −+ − − −+ + ⎣⎦ ∫  
where (, )
h
A AA AA A g hX YK t =+ + , and the  (, ; , )
i
j ki f h jA B ==  denote the unit 
capacity costs, assumed to be constant. Note that we impose constant returns to scale 
in port and hinterland capacity.  
                                                 
11 An alternative setup would be to include shippers’ surplus in the local welfare function, to the extent 
that shipping companies are locally owned.  Anticipating on results, doing so will reduce the difference 
between local and global surplus-maximizing solutions, while increasing the difference between the 
duopoly outcome and the local surplus maximizing outcome.     15
  In analyzing the joint problem of optimal choices of port and hinterland 
capacity, it will be instructive to work in two steps
12. This seems useful in order to 
identify the implications of duopolistic pricing behavior by ports for government 
investment policies. In a first step, we describe the optimal investment rules assuming 
that the government treats port prices as given. This yields the optimal capacity rules 
under the conditions of exogenous prices, ignoring the possible reactions of ports’ 
pricing behavior to capacity decisions and the implications of this behavior for 
investment decisions. In a second step, we then focus on how capacity decisions are 
affected if the government explicitly anticipates the pricing behavior at the ports.  
 
4.1. Optimal investment policies: exogenous port prices 
 
  Treating port prices as given, the first-order conditions for optimal investment 
in port and hinterland capacities are given by, respectively: 
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We know generalized prices and costs are equal (see (1)), so the first term on the left-
hand-side of both equations is zero. Moreover, note that:  
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More port capacity generates extra port activities and this increases congestion on the 
hinterland. More hinterland capacity has a direct, negative, effect on the generalized 
cost of hinterland transport, plus indirect effects on costs due to changes in transport 
volumes. Overall, using the results derived in Appendix 1, the effect is easily shown 
to be negative, however. Hinterland investment reduces hinterland congestion.    
 Substituting  (9a)-(9b)  in  expressions (8a-8b), we obtain 
                                                 
12 See, among others, Barrett (1994) for a similar two-step procedure in the analysis of strategic 
environmental standards.   16
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These rules simply state that port and hinterland capacity are determined by 
comparing marginal benefits and costs. From the viewpoint of the local government’s 
welfare function, marginal benefits consist of three elements: potential reductions in 
hinterland transport costs for the local users, the extra port profits generated by 
capacity expansions and, finally, the induced extra tax revenues on hinterland 
transport. However, despite the very similar structure of the government’s first-order 
conditions, note the important difference referred to above (see (9a)-(9b)). Port 
capacity expansions raise the generalized cost of hinterland transport. This implies 
that port capacity expansions result in an extra cost from the viewpoint of the 
government. However, capacity investments in the hinterland road or rail network 
reduce hinterland congestion, generating an extra benefit. So, ceteris paribus, policy-
makers may be more inclined to invest in hinterland capacity than in port capacity. 
  The policy implications easily follow if we slightly reformulate the optimal 
capacity rules (10a)-(10b) as follows: 
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as the local marginal cost of congestion: it captures 
the impact of extra traffic on the time cost of hinterland transport for all local users.  
  First consider the optimal port capacity rule. The first term on the left hand 
side suggests that the local government in A has an incentive to invest in extra port 
capacity to stimulate activities and profits of the local port. The second term, 
however, indicates that the extra hinterland traffic that is induced by port expansion is 
to be considered a cost if the local toll falls short of the local marginal external 
congestion cost on the hinterland. As this is probably true for most European 
hinterland networks, where formal tolls have not been introduced, port expansions 
generate an extra cost on the hinterland, making port investments less attractive.   17
  To interpret the hinterland capacity rule, we again note that the government 
will stimulate investment to support port activities. A first benefit of investment is 
indeed again the effect on port profits, see the first term on the left hand side. 
Moreover, a second benefit of investment is that providing more hinterland capacity 








). The third 
term on the left hand side captures the indirect effects of capacity on hinterland 
congestion. The lower congestion levels on the hinterland will itself attract extra 
traffic. If the tax is below local marginal external cost, then the effect of induced 
traffic is a cost of the capacity investment. Note the role of existing hinterland taxes. 
Expressions (11a)-(11b) suggest that regions with high hinterland taxes (high fuel 
taxes, tolls for road use, etc.) relative to the external costs imposed on local traffic 
will, ceteris paribus, be more inclined to invest, both in port and in hinterland 
capacity.  
  
4.2. Optimal investment policies: the role of pricing policies by ports 
 
  Reconsider the problem of optimal capacity choices, but now also explicitly 
incorporate the effects of pricing reactions to capacity changes by the duopolistic 
ports. When deciding on their investments, we assume that governments now fully 
anticipate the effects of capacity changes on the Nash pricing game played by the 
private ports.  
  Consider first hinterland capacity; the first-order condition now becomes:  
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where the total effects are given by:   
  
NE NE
AA A A A A A A B
hh h h h
AA A A A A A B A
d h h h V h Vp Vp
dK K V K V p K p K
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=+ + + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
  
rrr N E r N E
AAA A A B
hh h h
A AA AB A
dX X X p X p
dK K p K p K




Substituting these relations into (12), and using the first-order condition for optimal 
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As before, the left-hand side summarizes potential marginal benefits of hinterland 
capacity expansion. The first three terms are the same as in (11b) above, the two final 
terms summarize the effects of taking into account the pricing reactions by ports to 
capacity expansion for hinterland transport.  
  First, the price responses in B affect port profits in A, as captured by the fourth 
term. Suppose, e.g., that better hinterland connections via investment in roads or rail 
in region A lead port B to reduce its price; note that this was found to be highly 
plausible (see section 2.2 above). This will in turn decrease port profits at A. The 
pricing response therefore reduces the benefits of extra hinterland investment, and the 
government’s optimal policy will be to invest less than it would in the absence of 
strategic pricing behavior. Second, however, there is another effect captured by the 
final term in (13a). Indeed, capacity-induced price changes in ports also have 
implications for the volume of traffic. If hinterland investment in A raises prices at 
port A and reduces the price at port B, then the hinterland traffic volume will decline. 
If the hinterland toll is below marginal external cost for local users, this provides an 
extra benefit of hinterland investment, and this will induce the government to invest 
more. In a certain sense, the induced traffic problem, typical for under-priced 
infrastructure, is mitigated by the pricing reactions at the competing port. The ultimate 
overall effect depends on the sign and magnitude of the third and fourth term. In 
regions with high un-priced hinterland congestion, the latter effect may well 
dominate; in that case the government strategically invests more in hinterland capacity 
because this induces ports to change prices in a way that reduces hinterland 
congestion.  
  Going through a similar analysis for port capacity, again using the port’s first-
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As before, the first three terms are the same as in (11a). The fourth term states that, if 
providing more port capacity in A induces port B to lower prices (which we found to 
be the case under linearity of demand and costs), then this reduces the benefit of the 
port investment, and optimal investment goes down. The reason is that the profit 
effect of higher port capacity is diluted by price reductions in the competing port. 
Moreover, the final term on the left-hand side implies that if, as suggested above, 
prices go down at both ports after the capacity increase and own price effects 
dominate, then this gives a further reduction in benefit, again leading to lower port 
capacity. This shows that strategic pricing by ports leads the government to invest less 
in port capacity than it otherwise would. Underinvestment raises profits and reduces 
hinterland congestion. 
 
4.3. Comparison of different other regimes 
  
To conclude this section, we again briefly compare capacity rules in different 
other regimes. A summary of findings is in Table 2. When port prices are determined 
by private port operators, capacity rules followed by the regional government take 
account of the induced port profits, as just explained above. Of course, this is not the 
case if local governments decide on prices as well as capacities; they just follow the 
rules (11a-11b). Finally, suppose a global authority controlled both regions and that 
takes account of the welfare of shippers. The capacity rules for this case are developed 
in Appendix 4. Interestingly, we find that it would follow standard first-best rules for 
optimal capacity: the marginal capacity cost equals the marginal benefit of capacity 
investment. The benefits just consist of the direct reduction in the time costs of port 
use (for port investment) and the reduction in hinterland time costs enjoyed by all 
hinterland users, local as well as port-related (case of hinterland investment). That the 
authority would follow first-best capacity rules, despite the absence of an optimal 
hinterland toll, can be explained by the availability of an extra pricing instrument,   20
viz., port prices. The result implies that the authority would correct inappropriate 
pricing of hinterland traffic by adjusting port prices, not by adjusting capacity rules.  
  
5. Numerical illustration 
 
In this section, we use a numerical version of the model to illustrate the main 
interactions contained in the analytical model. Moreover, the numerical exercise 
allows us to investigate the role of some crucial parameters, such as the slope of the 
demand and congestion functions, and to point at the role of hinterland tolls. Finally, 
we briefly consider asymmetries between regions.    
 
5.1. Properties of the numerical model 
 
For simplicity, we assume initially that the two regions are perfectly 
symmetrical, so that the traffic flows on the respective hinterlands and the transport 
flows passing through the two ports are equal in the equilibrium. The parameter 
values used do not describe any particular real world example, but they are selected to 
obtain reasonable orders of magnitude for price elasticities and estimates of marginal 
external costs of port and hinterland congestion. They imply an elasticity of overall 
shipping demand with respect to the generalized price of about -0.2; the price 
elasticity of demand for local hinterland road use was approximately -0.1.  The former 
is higher, on the assumption that shippers have other options than the two ports A and 
B explicitly considered by the model. For example, the model could describe 
competition between Antwerp and Rotterdam for shipping demand from overseas to 
the German Ruhr area; obviously, then, shippers have other options in the Le Havre – 
Hamburg range for their shipments.
13 Precise information on the demand elasticities 
relevant for this model is hard to come by; as will be shown, however, changing 
elasticities of demand for port and for local traffic by the same proportion only affects 
the size of differences between scenarios, but not the nature of the differences.  
The situation captured in the illustration is one where port-related hinterland 
transport is important, accounting for about half of total transport demand on the 
hinterland. For road transport, this implies a focus on the vicinity of the port, where 
                                                 
13 Restricting attention to the interaction between Antwerp and Rotterdam makes sense, however, 
because of their proximity and their large market share (see, e.g., Notteboom, 2006)   21
the contribution of port traffic to congestion is prominent. For rail, it reflects the 
situation on particular rail lines connecting ports with industrial areas, where the 
shares of port-related traffic are large. The calibrated marginal external costs in the 
reference situation are about 50% of the private time cost of port and road use. The 
marginal port handling cost and the marginal operating cost of hinterland transport 
(excluding time costs) are constant and, without further loss of generality, are set 
equal to zero.  We also set hinterland tolls equal to zero, except where mentioned. 
 
5.2. Key Results for the base scenario 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the base scenario; three cases are 
considered. The first one, labeled “private”, is the situation discussed extensively in 
the theoretical section of the paper: what pricing and investment policies can one 
expect if the two ports are privately operated and they compete in a Cournot structure, 
but country governments decide on port and hinterland capacities. The welfare 
function of the country governments is the one studied in the theoretical section; it 
captures the surplus of local hinterland users, profits of the local port, toll revenues (if 
any) and port and hinterland capacity costs. The second case, denoted “local surplus”, 
considers the situation where the two local governments decide on port prices as well 
as capacities, again maximizing the country welfare function. The third case is that of 
“global surplus” maximization, where a central decision-maker maximizes overall 
surplus for the whole network; this includes the surplus of all port users in the two 
ports plus the local surplus on the two hinterlands. Note that this third case does not 
correspond to the first-best, as hinterland tolls are constrained and generally differ 
from marginal congestion costs. 
  The bottom line of Table 3 shows that, as expected, the total surplus increases 
as the objective function becomes ‘more inclusive’: it is lowest for the “private ports” 
case and, obviously, highest for the “global surplus” case.  What is less obvious is that 
the biggest increase in the total surplus occurs in the transition from “local surplus” to 
“global surplus”.  To interpret this, note that the key differences between the “private” 
and “local” surplus cases are whether prices are set by the private operator or the 
public authority and, related to this, the treatment of port profits; they are maximized 
in setting prices in the “private” case, they are taken into account as part of the 
objective function in the “local surplus” case. The key difference between the “local   22
surplus” and the “global surplus” case lies in the absence or presence of regional 
coordination and the inclusion of shippers’ surplus in the objective function. The 
numerical results therefore suggest that regional coordination and taking account of 
shippers’ surplus leads to a larger welfare gain than bringing port prices under local 
control.   
  Related to this, we observe from Table 3 that the composition of the total 
surplus differs across scenarios.  The biggest change is the increase, in absolute and 
relative terms, of shippers’ surplus in the “global surplus” case.  This result is 
reminiscent of De Borger et al. (2005), where it is found that global surplus 
maximization leads to large surplus gains, in particular for through-traffic; the same 
holds for shippers’ surplus on the throughput X which passes through the port. 
Further, note that in moving from the “private” case to the “local surplus” case, both 
local surplus and port profits increase (these components get the same weight in the 
objective function).   
It may seem counterintuitive that profits are higher in the local surplus case 
than in the private port case. The results in Table 3 suggest that it is a combination of 
two factors. First, the discussion in section 3.1 indicated that, for given capacity 
levels, publicly operated ports may actually charge higher prices than private ports 
because, if tolls are below marginal external cost, they take full account of the 
beneficial downward effect of higher port prices on hinterland congestion. Second, 
investment behaviour differs between the two regimes as well. In the “private” case, 
the local government takes account of the effect of capacity investments on prices by 
private ports operators; it does not directly controls port prices. In the “local surplus” 
case, it does. This induces the local government to invest less in port and hinterland 
capacity when prices are privately determined, because in this case capacity increases 
reduce the prices set by the private ports, and hence port profit. The latter is part of the 
local government welfare function. 
Figures in Table 3 confirm this intuitive story. Port prices are higher in the 
local surplus case than in the case of private ports; at the same time, both port and 
hinterland capacities are larger in the first case as well. There is a bit more local 
hinterland travel (where the time cost has decreased due to investment), leading to a 
higher local surplus. Most interestingly, however, note that the combination of lower 
time costs and higher port prices in the local surplus case only slightly restrains port 
demand, so that port profits rise. Paradoxically, then, the port may be better off by   23
giving up price control (but retaining rights to port revenues), since this leads to more 
port capacity and to higher profits.  
Finally, note that port prices are lower in the case of global surplus 




5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
We briefly report on the results of a series of sensitivity analyses with respect 
to important parameters of the problem: the slope and position of the inverse demand 
functions, the slope of the congestion functions, changing road tolls, and deviating 
from symmetry. Table 4 summarizes some results. 
A first exercise is to tilt the inverse demand functions for both local and 
shipping traffic, approximately around the equilibrium point of the private port 
solution described in Table 3, by increasing the absolute value of the slope of the 
demand functions and adapting intercepts accordingly. The change implies that 
shipping demand becomes less responsive to price changes. Results in Table 4 show 
that this raises port prices under all regimes; implications for capacity investment are 
very small. Shippers’ surplus of course strongly rises
15.  
Second, we also explored the sensitivity of results to the slope of congestion 
functions; results are not included in the table for the sake of brevity.  Changing the 
slope of both the port and road congestion functions, making them very small, reduces 
congestibility in the system as a whole.  Since congestion drives many results in the 
model, its virtual absence reduces the differences among the three scenarios. If ports 
alone become less congestion-prone, we found that capacity expenditures on ports 
decline. 
Third, in all previous scenarios, the road toll is equal to zero.  We now briefly 
look at the impact of setting positive tolls. In the lower part of Table 4, we report 
results for tolls equal to 0 (the base case), 2.5 and 5. Aggregate surplus rises when 
                                                 
14 Observe that port time costs and marginal external costs at the port are the same in the local and 
global surplus cases. This is an artefact of the setup of the model; it is a consequence of the linearity of 
port congestion functions in volume-capacity ratios.   
15 Tilting the inverse demand functions by keeping their intercept at the initial value but doubling their 
slope (not shown in the table) increases market power and this leads to bigger mark-ups, resulting 
mainly in higher profits and lower capacity levels. 
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moving from a zero toll to a toll equal to 2.5, but then declines again if the toll is 
exogenously further increased to 5. This just reflects the fact that this high toll 
exceeds the first best level, equal to marginal external congestion costs. All 
components of the surplus decline as tolls rise, except toll revenues.  Note that higher 
hinterland road tolls indeed reduce optimal port prices under all regimes, as suggested 
in the theoretical sections. In the global surplus scenario, investments in capacity are 
lower when the toll is higher, because less capacity is required to reduce time costs at 
the lower levels of demand.  But under private port pricing, capacity investments 
increase as tolls rise, as an indirect way for government to moderate generalized 
prices, especially for port users.   
  Finally, we looked at the implications of asymmetric ports in the sense of 
having different congestibility. For example, it is well known that Rotterdam has 
much easier access (less congestibility) than the port of Antwerp. This is the case even 
after deepening of the Scheldt, the river connecting the port to the sea. Technically, 
differences like this are approximated by assuming that the slope of the congestion 
function in A is much higher than in B. The results are reported in the upper right part 
of Table 4. We find that demand in the more congestible port is much smaller, time 
costs are higher, and optimal port investments are higher. Interestingly, however, port 
prices at the more congestible port are lower under all three scenarios. In all cases, 
lower congestibility attracts more traffic through the port. Note that the price 
difference is most pronounced for the case of private port pricing. Part of the reason is 
that the elasticity-related markup that a port charges depends on the congestion level 
at the competing port (see the term  B θ  in expression (5)). Not surprisingly, in the case 
of global surplus maximizing behavior a very large share of all investment in capacity 
is drawn to the low-congestibility region B. Since no markups are charged in the 
global case, the resulting price differences at the port are more modest.       
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
  In this paper we studied duopolistic pricing by ports that are congestible and 
that share a downstream, congestible transport network with other users on their 
respective hinterlands. Local (country) governments decide on port capacity as well as   25
on investment in the hinterland network. Within this setting we obtained a number of 
interesting results.  
  A first general finding is that private ports will, to the extent that it affects 
their customers, internalize hinterland congestion in the prices they charge for the use 
of their services. Interestingly, we also showed that, if the country governments 
directly controlled prices of the port within their jurisdiction, they may actually charge 
even higher prices than private operators. The reason is that this allows them to take 
into account un-priced congestion effects on users of the hinterland network. A 
second general finding is that investments in port capacity reduce port prices. 
However, additional investments in hinterland capacity in a given country increase the 
user prices at the local port; they reduce prices at the competing port. A third result 
was the role of hinterland congestion in judging investments. We found that the main 
benefits for a country of expanding capacity of the local port, viz. the increase in port 
activities and profits, may be strongly reduced by an extra cost, viz. the impact of 
induced port traffic on hinterland congestion. For investment in hinterland capacity, 
the main benefits are the reduced local user costs and the induced port activities; these 
benefits dominate the negative effects of the induced port traffic on hinterland 
congestion. Finally, imposing congestion tolls on the hinterland network contributes 
to higher capacity investments in ports as well as to higher investments in hinterland 
capacity.  
  The models and numerical illustrations presented in this paper offer some 
modest guidance to judge pricing and investment policies. One observation is related 
to the fact that the EC advocates the use of marginal cost pricing for all transport 
services, including sea ports (see the Green Paper on Seaports and Maritime 
Infrastructure (European Commission, 1997) and the so-called Port Package 
(European Commission, 2001)). The results of this paper suggest that marginal 
(private plus external) cost pricing of port services is only globally optimal, provided 
that port hinterlands are appropriately taxed at marginal external cost as well. Not 
surprisingly, if no tolls are charged on the hinterland to control for congestion, then it 
is optimal to charge more for port services to signal the contribution of port users to 
hinterland congestion.  
  Another comment follows from the observation that current port pricing is 
apparently not guided by the proposed EU-principles. Indeed, surveys show that 
European ports are aware of the high substitution possibilities between ports for   26
unitized goods (containers); they compete in prices as well as through product 
differentiation and overall quality. These observations are consistent with the results 
of this paper. They suggest that oligopolistic competition between ports facing 
congestion at the facility and on the hinterland is likely to yield much higher port 
prices than marginal social cost. Ports charge a substantial markup over marginal 
external cost.  
  Finally, we have argued that country governments have an incentive to raise 
port capacity to stimulate activities and profits of the local port. Moreover, the 
numerical results suggested that this will be even more the case in countries where 
port prices are largely controlled by the government. Overall, in the presence of 
market power for ports, the market predicts too low capacities. These observations are 
not consistent with the widespread feeling among transport economists that European 
port capacity is on ‘the high side’. Of course, there may be other contributing factors 
to relatively high investments levels. They could also partially be due to ‘common 
pool’ incentives for port operators and efficient lobbying for large public investments 
to improve their profits.     27
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Appendix 1: Reduced form demand characteristics 
 
  We here derive the partial effects of taxes and capacities on demands. We start 
from the system: 
 
() ( , ) ( , )
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+= + + + +
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== + +
             (A1.1) 
First we solve the two last equations for local road demand as a function of the 
hinterland capacity and toll levels, and of transit demand:  
   (,, ) , (,, )
hh
A AAA A B BBB B Yz X K t Yz X K t ==              (A1.2) 
Partials with respect to capacity and port-related traffic  A X are given by: 

















         (A1.3) 
More facility use in A raises hinterland transport demand and reduces local demand 
because of higher congestion; more road capacity raises local transport demand. 
Similarly for B. 
  Substituting (A1.2) into the first two equations of (A1.1) for port-related 
traffic yields: 
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Differentiating and solving by Cramer’s rule yields the following partial effects of 
prices and capacities on reduced-form demands for port use: 
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                  (A1.7) 
The signs of (A1.5) and (A1.6) directly follow from using (A1.3). Moreover, the 
positive sign of Δdirectly follows from substituting (A1.5) into (A1.7).  
  Interpretation of (A1.4) is easy. Higher port prices at A reduce demand at A 
and raise it at port B. Increases in port capacity in port A raise demand at A, and 
lower demand at B. Finally, better hinterland capacity at A also raises demand in A 
and reduces it in B.  
  Finally, the effects on local hinterland transport are easily derived as well. We 
find, using (A1.2)-(A1.4) and some algebra
16:  






























                 (A1.8) 
Higher port prices in A raise local demand on A’s hinterland road network because 
they reduce congestion of port-related traffic. The opposite hold for a price increase at 
port B. Port capacity in A reduces hinterland local traffic and raises it at B, again due 
to congestion effects of port-related traffic. Finally, more hinterland capacity in A 
raises hinterland local demand at A and at B: the shift in port traffic from B to A 
reduces congestion on the hinterland in B as well. 
 
                                                 
16 To be more precise, all signs immediately follow from differentiating (A1.2) and using the signs 
reported in (A1.4). However, there is one exception. Since differentiating  (,; )
h
A AA A zXKtwith 
respect to hinterland capacity yields two effects of opposite sign, viz. a positive direct effect and a 











. The formal proof is available from the authors.    31
Appendix 2: Price setting behavior of private port facilities 
 
  Consider facility A. It solves: 
    ( , ,,,,) (( . ) )
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rf f h h r
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M a x p XppKKKK CX π =−  
The first-order condition implies: 
























 is the marginal production cost at facility A. Using the 
expression for the impact of facility price on demand, see (A1.4), we can rearrange 
this to yield: 
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In this expression we defined: 











as the marginal external cost at facility A. Finally, again using the definition of 
B M this can be reformulated as:  
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is the marginal external congestion cost of a traffic increase on 
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algebra shows that this implies that  1 0 B θ − << .    32
Appendix 3. Locally optimal policies: the government directly controls port 
prices and capacity investment decisions 
 
  Suppose the government of each region controls all instruments, including port 
prices. Conditional on prices and capacities at the competing region, the government 
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where,  
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Substituting these expressions, we obtain: 
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The capacity rules are obviously the same as in the case with exogenous port prices 
analyzed before, see (13a)-(13b) in section 3.1. Working out the pricing rule, carefully 
following the steps explained in Appendix 2, yields after simple algebra: 
   () () 1
X
fh r A
A AA AA A B
A
zp




=++ − + + ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
 
This basically says that the government would use the same pricing rule as a profit 
maximizing private port with one exception. It would internalize the full marginal 
external congestion cost of hinterland use, including the time losses on local traffic, in 
port prices. A private port only charges for the external cost to the extent that it affects 
their customers. It also implies that port prices under public control structurally 
exceed those under private control. 
 
 
Appendix 4: First-best pricing and investment rules  
 
  Suppose one government operates the complete system of ports and hinterland 
networks. How would it decide on port pricing and investment rules for port and 
hinterland capacity, assuming that it cares for shippers as well as hinterland users of 
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                           (A3.1) 
  
The first line of the objective function captures the net benefits to local users of the 
hinterland network in both regions A and B. The net benefits equal the surplus of 
local users minus generalized costs. The second line captures the total net benefits of 
port users. The first integral term is the total willingness to pay of all port users (i.e., 
all users of ports A and B) for the complete trip (port use plus hinterland use). Net 
benefits are obtained by subtracting monetary port costs, the time costs in the ports   34
and, finally, the time cost on the hinterland. The third line captures all capacity costs 
and the tax revenues on the hinterland. 
  We first focus on the port pricing problem for given capacities. The first-order 
condition for optimal pricing at port A can be written as, using equality of generalized 
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where,  
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Substituting these expressions in the first-order condition, we obtain, using the 
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Noting that, for i=A,B:    35
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We develop the first-order condition for the price of port B in a completely analogous 
fashion. Then note that the equality between the generalized price and the generalized 
cost of port-related transport (port plus hinterland cost) implies that 
()
X
A AA A pX p f h t =++ +   (see (1)), and similarly for B. Solving the first-order 
conditions we then immediately see that optimal prices are given by: 
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  Next, consider optimal investment rules. The first-order conditions of problem 
(A3.1) for the various capacities all have the same structure. Take the one for port 
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Substituting these expressions in the first-order condition, noting that 
()
X
A AA A pX p f h t =++ + , and using the optimal pricing rules (A3.2)-(A3.3), we 












This just says that the marginal capacity cost should equal the marginal benefit of 
capacity investment. The latter is just the direct reduction of the time cost of port use. 
  In a similar fashion we find for hinterland investment: 











This states that the capacity cost of hinterland investment should equal the reduction 
in hinterland time costs enjoyed by all hinterland users. 
  These findings have an interesting implication. They suggest that a 
supranational authority responsible for port prices as well as investment decisions 
would correct for its inability to charge the appropriate hinterland tolls by adjusting 
port prices, but that investment rules would be first-best.  
 
 
Appendix 5. The Nash equilibrium in prices with linear demands and linear 
congestion functions  
 
  To study the effect of capacities on Nash equilibrium port prices, we start by 
noting that the port’s first-order condition for optimal pricing   














implicitly defines the reaction function  (; , , , , , )
Rf f h h
A BABAB A B p pKKKKt t. The implicit 
function theorem then leads to:   37



























where the denominator can be shown to be positive by the second-order condition for 
optimal pricing. The effects of the various capacities are derived in an analogous 
manner. For example, the effect of an increase in port capacity on prices at A, holding 
port prices at B constant, is given by: 



























  The Nash equilibrium can further be defined as the solution to the two reaction 
function. By Cramer’s rule, we then find that the impact of capacity changes on the 



















































































  Not surprisingly, many of the price effects of capacity changes are ambiguous 
in general. To simplify the analysis, we assume all demand and cost functions to be 
linear. We use the following specifications: 
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Note that  i β  is the slope of the congestion cost function at facility i (handling, 
processing, waiting);  i δ is the slope of the hinterland congestion cost function. The 
congestion functions assume that the time cost is proportional to the volume-capacity 
ratio. Note that we have set all intercepts of the congestion functions equal to zero to 
save on notation. A final simplification is that we set the marginal private production 
cost equal to zero. 
  Under the above assumptions, we obtain after simple but substantial algebra, 
using the above specifications, expressions (A1.4) and the formulas reported in 
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It follows, therefore, that: 
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  Using these results to evaluate the effect of capacity changes on Nash 
equilibrium prices, we substitute these findings in the above expressions. For 
increases in port capacity we immediately find:  
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Investment in more port capacity induces both ports to reduce prices. Unfortunately, 
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It follows that the effect of a hinterland capacity in a given region unambiguously 
reduces port prices at the competing port. This makes sense, because a capacity 
expansion of A’s hinterland reduces both port and hinterland congestion in B. 
However, the effect of a hinterland capacity increase on port prices in A are 
ambiguous in general. Since, using the definition of the  i M , the term 
()
23 22 A AB A BA cM M d X M ρρ ⎡⎤ −− ⎣⎦  is easily shown to be positive, the overall effect is 
positive, unless  A X is very large. That the impact is plausibly positive is no surprise. 
Better hinterland connections reduce hinterland congestion but raise port congestion. 
Unless  A X  is very large and makes up a large fraction of hinterland transport, 
however, the impact on port congestion will dominate and induce the port to raise 
prices.  
  Summarizing this discussion, we have the following result:     














Table 1. Summary of port pricing results under different regimes 










Yes Yes Yes,  but  only 
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Yes Yes Yes,  but  only 
to the extent 
that hinterland 
tolls are too 
low 
No   41
Table 2: The marginal benefits of investments taken into account under different 
regimes (note that marginal investment costs are the same under all regimes)   
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Table 3 Numerical illustration – Base Scenario 
Private Local  surplus  Global 
surplus 
X  Aggregate shipping demand  31.116  30.964  32.453 
  Shipping demand per port  15.558  15.482  16.226 
Y Local  demand  17.235  17.286  17.305 
f(.)  Port time cost  7.022  6.739  6.739 
h(.)  Road time cost  6.913  6.785  6.739 
p Port  price  8.274  9.066  5.391 
t   Road toll  0  0  0 
V Road  volume  32.793  32.768  33.531 
Kf Port  capacity  3.861  4.240  4.444 
Kh Road  capacity  8.443  8.825  9.183 
MECf  External congestion cost port  3.022  2.739  2.739 
MECh  External congestion cost road  2.913  2.785  2.739 
Surplus measures      
(1) Surplus shippers  1,210.284  1,198.472  1,316.486 
(2) Surplus local traffic  371.297  373.511  374.309 
(3) Port profits (equal to revenues)  128.731  140.365  87.470 
(4) Toll revenues  0  0  0 
(5) Capital expenditures ports  38.614  42.399  44.438 
(6) Capital expenditures roads  84.429  88.252  91.828 
(7) Total surplus  
      = 1+2*(2+3+4)-2*(5+6) 
1,964.254 1,964.922  1,967.513 
 Table 4 Sensitivity analysis 
  Base scenario  Tilted demand function  Asymmetrical regions 
  Private Local  surplus  Global 
surplus 






Region:   A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A  B  A  B  A  B 
f(.): port time cost  7.022  6.739  6.739 7.016 6.739 6.739 7.2  4.8  6.7  4.7  6.7  4.7 
h(.): road time 
cost 
6.913  6.785  6.739 6.885 6.762 6.739 7.0  6.9  6.8  6.8  6.7  6.7 
P: port price  8.274  9.066  5.391 8.489 9.279 5.432 5.8  8.4  6.7  8.8  5.3  7.3 
KF: port capacity  3.861  4.240  4.444 3.864 4.245 4.351  2.9  1.3  3.4  1.4  0  2.3 
KH: road capacity  8.443  8.825  9.183 8.521 8.899 9.081 7.5  9.5  8.0  9.9  4.7  13.6 
Surplus shippers  1,210.284 1,198.472  1,316.486  2,414.913  2,402.853 2,524.316  1,279 1,272  1,319 
Surplus local 
traffic 
371.297  373.511  374.309 743.071 745.207 745.603  370  371  373  374  374  374 
Port profits   128.731  140.365  87.470 131.924  143.840 86.316  73  163  84  171  0.01  239 
Toll revenues  0  0  0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Total surplus  1,964.254 1,964.922  1,967.513  3,917.210  3,918.068 3,919.519  1,957 1,958  1,973 
  Base scenario  Low toll (Toll = 2.5)  High toll (Toll = 5) 
 Private  Local  surplus  Global 
surplus 
Private Local  surplus Global 
surplus 
Private Local  surplus  Global 
surplus 
Region:   A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B  A and B 
f(.): port time cost  7.022  6.739  6.739 6.552 6.739  6.739 6.182 6.739  6.739 
h(.): road time 
cost 
6.913  6.785  6.739 6.648 6.743  6.793 6.393 6.700  6.739 
P: port price  8.274  9.066  5.391 7.251 6.623  2.969 6.398 4.182  0.553 
KF: port capacity  3.861  4.240  4.444 4.529 4.239  4.439 5.226 4.238  4.435 
KH: road capacity  8.443  8.825  9.183 8.992 8.691  8.905 9.605 8.555  8.626 
Surplus shippers  1,210.284 1,198.472  1,316.486  1187.318  1198.021  1313.928 1156.011 1197.509  1311.213 
Surplus local 
traffic 
371.297 373.511  374.309  333.774  332.232 332.298  298.099  293.379 292.787 
Port profits   128.731 140.365  87.470  111.733  102.518 48.137  97.286  64.724  8.959 
Toll revenues  0 0  0  79.376  79.455  81.288  153.241 153.979  157.492 
Total surplus  1,964.254 1,964.922  1,967.513  1966.659  1967.828  1970.491 1956.634 1965.816  1968.467 
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